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Shareholder Coalitions, Voting power, and Dividend Policy: New Evidence from Tunisia المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
The dividend decision is probably the most controversial of the long-term financial decision making. The seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) established that, in frictionless world, when investment policy is held constant, a firm’s dividend policy has no consequences for shareholder wealth. Higher dividend payout ratios lead to lower retained earnings and capital gains, and vice versa, leaving shareholders’ wealth unaffected. Motivated by Lintner’s (1956) finding that firms follow wellconsidered payout strategies, financial theory has offered a range of explanations for dividend policies based on agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outside shareholders, signalling theories, and taxes. ...
Ownership-control discrepancy and dividend policy: Evidence from Tunisia المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
The corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on mitigating agency conflicts between managers and shareholders due to a separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Recent empirical studies have shown that in most countries publicly traded firms often have large shareholders, giving rise to another agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders ( LaPorta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. (2000, 2002); Faccio and Lang, 2002; Barca and Becht, 2002; Masulis et al. 2009; Jong et al. 2011). This observation contrasts with the Berle-Means thesis of the “widely held corporation” and indicates that several firms with controlling shareholders become more widespread through many countries around the world.The potential problems involved in large shareholders representing their own interests become particularly aggressive if their control rights are significantly more important than their equivalent level of cash flow rights. ...
Can Dividend Serve as a Disciplinary Mechanism? Evidence from Tunisia المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
During the three last decades, economists have proposed a number of explanations of the dividend puzzle. Of these, the idea that dividend payments are expected to attenuate agency problems between corporate insiders and outside shareholders. According to Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006), dividend can reduce agency conflict for many reasons. First, dividend generates external monitoring by forcing managers into the capital market to raise funds. Second, dividends reduce free cash flows that could otherwise be spent by managers on their private benefits rather than maximizing shareholders’ wealth. ...
Does the Contribution of Dividend to Firm Value Depend on Controlling Shareholders? المنصف بوعنان قيزاني

In their ideal world with perfect markets, rational behavior and perfect certainty, Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani (1961) have established that the value of the firm is unaffected by its dividend policy. This is what the authors qualify as the ‘the irrelevance of dividend policy’. Since this proposition, the academic literature, by relaxing these simplified assumptions, has focused on the impact of dividend policy on the value of the fi rm. In this paper, we try to answer the following question: Does the contribution of dividend to firms’ value depend on their control structure?

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Controlling Shareholders’ Activism Quality and the Disciplinary Role of Dividend المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
During the three last decades, economists have proposed a number of explanations of the dividend puzzle. One of these explanations is the idea that dividend payments are expected to attenuate agency problems between corporate insiders and outside shareholders. According to Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), dividend can reduce agency conflict for many reasons. First, dividend generates external monitoring by forcing managers into the capital market to raise funds. Second, dividends reduce free cash flows that could otherwise be spent by managers on their private benefits rather than maximizing shareholders’ wealth. ...
Outside Directors and Firm Performance : The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
Corporate governance structures and mechanisms have so far been the main focus of many managerial and financial studies. Specifically, the impact of corporate board structure on firm performance has become one of the most discussed issues in the literature (Fama, 1980; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). Prior research suggests that the board of directors and its monitoring is considered to be the most relevant internal governance mechanism to control managers from self-satisfying behavior (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Kiel and Nicholson (2003) suggest that boards of directors’ monitoring can reduce agency costs and, thus, improve firm performance. The extent to which more independent directors on the board benefits shareholders is the subject of much debate in corporate governance literature. ...
The financial determinants of corporate cash holdings in an oil rich country: Evidence from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
The existing research on corporate cash holdings is replete with evidence from the U.S and developed markets with little attention given to the emerging markets. Several factors make cash holdings different in emerging markets from that of developed markets. According to Scott (1995), institutional factors may affect firm's financial practices such as cash holdings. One of these factors is the socio-economic factor including laws, and actor's attitudes which is considered to be weak in many emerging markets relative to that in developed markets such as the US (North, 2005). This is likely to raise the level of uncertainty in transactions and consequently encourage a range of unproductive practices such as cash retention (Al-Najjar, 2013). Moreover, slow institutional development (i.e., stock market, bank, and other financial institutions) may motivate firms to adopt conservative financial practices (North, 2005). As an emerging market, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has different business practices. KSA is an oil rich country, the stock market is relatively underdeveloped and an Islamic banking system is present, the legal origin is based on Sharia Law. Two of the most important aspects of the Islamic values relating to corporate financing are that Islamic law prohibits loan interests whether giving or taking by individuals or business institutions. Second, the obligation of Zaket that should be giving, calculated based on the capital of the business or individual, and given to specific groups (Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010). The first objective of this research is to provide empirical evidence on the determinants of...
Free Cash Flow, Agency Cost and Dividend Policy of Sharia-Compliant and Non-Sharia-Compliant firms المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
In his seminal work, Jensen (1986) defines free cash flow as cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present value when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. The free cash flow theory developed by the author states that companies with substantial cash flow and poor investment opportunities always tend to face conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. According to Labhane and Mahakud (2016), the excess amount of free cash flow in the hands of managers increases the agency cost as they are free to use these financial reserves for their own interests. Excessive free cash flow available to managers leads to overinvestment due to investment in projects with negative net present value (Jensen, 1986). To avoid any wasteful expenditure, shareholders of such firms monitor the activities of managers. These monitoring activities increase the firm cost of monitoring and hence increase the agency cost. Apart from using free cash flow to invest in projects with negative net present value, Kadioglu and Yilmaz (2017) suggest that managers tend to make unnecessary expenditures aligned with their personal interests. One way to reduce the free cash flow problem is to pay out more of the free cash flow as dividends (Fairchild, 2010). Distributing cash to shareholders reduces the chance that the managers may use the available resources inappropriately. According to Jensen (1986) and Lang and Litzenberger (1989), dividend payouts can be seen as means to reduce the free cash flow that managers can...
The mediating effect of dividend payout on the relationship between internal governance and free cash flow المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
How firms limit their free cash flow (FCF) in the face of low investment opportunities is one of the most important research topics in financial economics. This is the case because low investment opportunities can distort the efficient allocation of internal funds and destroy firm value. When firms have limited investment opportunities, cash holdings are largely at risk of being diverted by managers in projects that benefit them personally, thereby damaging the interests of shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Dittmar et al., 2003). The FCF hypothesis of agency theory suggests that excess cash reserves increase managerial discretion and provides managers with the incentive to pursue their own interests. The problem stems from self-serving managers who divert cash flow to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. Myers and Rajan (1998) suggest that managers tend to retain more private benefits from liquid assets, and Byrd (2010) argues that FCF is available to managers for discretionary purpose. Opler et al. (1999) highlight managers’ preference forthe control that comes with holding high levels of cash reserves. Apart from using FCF to invest in projects with negative net present value (NPV), Kadioglu and Yilmaz (2017) suggest that managers tend to make unnecessary expenditures that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders’ interests. According to Labhane and Mahakud (2016), the excess amount of FCF in the hands of managers increases the agency cost, as they are free to use these financial reserves for their own interests. To avoid any wasteful expenditure, shareholders of such...
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