دور الأدوات المساعدة للتكاليف المستهدفة في فاعلية قرارات التسعير (في المنشآت الصناعية السودانية) معاطف محمد مسلم
The study aimed at highlighting the role played by the target cost input to increase the effectiveness of pricing decisions. The study discussed the use of auxiliary tools for the target cost and its impact in making pricing decisions. The model was applied to Sudanese industrial establishments that are distinguished and unique. The study followed the statistical methods of the analytical descriptive approach. The study reached to several results. The most important of which were the statistical significant relationship between the target costs and pricing decisions in the industrial establishments, there were a statistically significant relationship between the auxiliary tools for the target cost and the effectiveness of pricing decisions in industrial establishments. The application of tools for targeted costs contributes to providing an opportunity for industrial enterprises to take pricing decisions that enable them to control prices, maintain customers, stay in the market and achieve leadership.
Chief executive officer compensation, corporate governance and performance: evidence from KSA firms جعفر محمد عبد الكريم
Chief executive officer compensation, corporate governance and performance: evidence from KSA firms
Author: Gaafar Abdalkrim.
Publication: Corporate Governance.
Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited
Vol. 19 No. 6, pp. 1216-1235
https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-09-2017-0228.Copyright © 2019, Emerald Publishing Limited.
RISK MANAGEMENT IN ONLINE TRANSACTIONS: AN ISSUE OF SYSTEM AND NETWORK SECURITY بشرى محمد الأمين النعيم
Saudi Arabia is remarkably adopting technical developments just like the other developed countries whereas online shopping is also being common there. However, there are still some major concerns that remain in regard to information technology and its security. The concept of IT risk management is regarded as a system of a wider enterprise related to risk management. Previously, the information systems of the organizations have seen the rise of security breaches. The current era of the e-commerce web application is faced with the vulnerabilities, manipulated by hackers and other people possessing negative vibes and emotions. These days’ online frauds are most common and are on the rise than ever before . The idea of this research is to determine the troubles and insecurities in regard to transactions in a case when consumer deal with online retailers in Saudi Arabia. The main objectives of the research include understanding of the transactional insecurities, determining the influence of the network insecurities on e-commerce and knowing the perspective of users about online shopping and the threats they face in online shopping. This research will give the
Shareholder Coalitions, Voting power, and Dividend Policy: New Evidence from Tunisia المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
The dividend decision is probably the most controversial of the long-term financial decision making. The seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) established that, in frictionless world, when investment policy is held constant, a firm’s dividend policy has no consequences for shareholder wealth. Higher dividend payout ratios lead to lower retained earnings and capital gains, and vice versa, leaving shareholders’ wealth unaffected. Motivated by Lintner’s (1956) finding that firms follow wellconsidered payout strategies, financial theory has offered a range of explanations for dividend policies based on agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outside shareholders, signalling theories, and taxes.
Ownership-control discrepancy and dividend policy: Evidence from Tunisia المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
The corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on mitigating agency conflicts between managers and shareholders due to a separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Recent empirical studies have shown that in most countries publicly traded firms often have large shareholders, giving rise to another agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders ( LaPorta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. (2000, 2002); Faccio and Lang, 2002; Barca and Becht, 2002; Masulis et al. 2009; Jong et al. 2011). This observation contrasts with the Berle-Means thesis of the “widely held corporation” and indicates that several firms with controlling shareholders become more widespread through many countries around the world.The potential problems involved in large shareholders representing their own interests become particularly aggressive if their control rights are significantly more important than their equivalent level of cash flow rights.
Can Dividend Serve as a Disciplinary Mechanism? Evidence from Tunisia المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
During the three last decades, economists have proposed a number of explanations of the dividend puzzle. Of these, the idea that dividend payments are expected to attenuate agency problems between corporate insiders and outside shareholders. According to Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006), dividend can reduce agency conflict for many reasons. First, dividend generates external monitoring by forcing managers into the capital market to raise funds. Second, dividends reduce free cash flows that could otherwise be spent by managers on their private benefits rather than maximizing shareholders’ wealth.
Employment of multimedia technology to develop some skills kinetic self for children with learning difficulties هالة خيرى الجوهرى
in a positive interaction between the learner and learning resources to achieve, leading to improving the educational process and get to learn the best, if properly employed to make the learning experience more realistic and closer to life and more acceptable for the application, and to achieve more kinds of learning impact and usefulness.
Many forms have appeared in multimedia technology used in individualized instruction and meet individual differences in personality educated misfits them and those with special needs, including, for example:
- Programmed instruction Programmed instruction.
Does the Contribution of Dividend to Firm Value Depend on Controlling Shareholders? المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
In their ideal world with perfect markets, rational behavior and perfect certainty, Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani (1961) have established that the value of the firm is unaffected by its dividend policy. This is what the authors qualify as the ‘the irrelevance of dividend policy’. Since this proposition, the academic literature, by relaxing these simplified assumptions, has focused on the impact of dividend policy on the value of the fi rm. In this paper, we try to answer the following question: Does the contribution of dividend to firms’ value depend on their control structure?
Controlling Shareholders’ Activism Quality and the Disciplinary Role of Dividend المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
During the three last decades, economists have proposed a number of explanations of the dividend puzzle. One of these explanations is the idea that dividend payments are expected to attenuate agency problems between corporate insiders and outside shareholders. According to Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), dividend can reduce agency conflict for many reasons. First, dividend generates external monitoring by forcing managers into the capital market to raise funds. Second, dividends reduce free cash flows that could otherwise be spent by managers on their private benefits rather than maximizing shareholders’ wealth.
Outside Directors and Firm Performance : The Moderating Effects of Ownership and Board Leadership Structure المنصف بوعنان قيزاني
Corporate governance structures and mechanisms have so far been the main focus of many managerial and financial studies. Specifically, the impact of corporate board structure on firm performance has become one of the most discussed issues in the literature (Fama, 1980; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). Prior research suggests that the board of directors and its monitoring is considered to be the most relevant internal governance mechanism to control managers from self-satisfying behavior (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Kiel and Nicholson (2003) suggest that boards of directors’ monitoring can reduce agency costs and, thus, improve firm performance. The extent to which more independent directors on the board benefits shareholders is the subject of much debate in corporate governance literature.